In this paper we introduce a logic for parametric polymorphism. Just as LCF is a logic for the simply-typed λ-calculus with recursion and arithmetic, our logic is a logic for System F. The logic permits the formal presentation and use of relational parametricity. Parametricity yields-for example-encodings of initial algebras, final co-algebras and abstract datatypes, with corresponding proof principles of induction, co-induction and simulation.
Introduction
In this paper we introduce a logic for parametric polymorphism, in the binary relational sense of Reynolds [Rey83] . Just as LCF is a first-order logic for the simply-typed λ-calculus, with recursion and arithmetic, so our logic is a second-order logic for System F. It is intended as a step towards a general logic of polymorphically typed programs. The terms are those of the second-order λ-calculus, and the formulae are built from equations and relations by propositional operators and quantifiers over elements of types, or over types, or over relations between types. The logic permits the formal presentation and use of relational parametricity, which is expressed by an axiom schema. Parametricity yields-for example-encodings of initial algebras, final co-algebras and abstract datatypes, with corresponding proof principles of induction, co-induction and simulation.
Our first goal is to provide a formal system for arguments that exploit relational parametricity. In all models of System F, standard constructions such as products and initial algebras are available in a weak sense (see e.g. [Böh85, Has90, RP90, Wra89] ). If the models are relationally parametric, then these constructions become universal constructions in the usual sense of category theory. Bainbridge, Freyd, Scedrov, and Scott have given such results for the parametric Per model [BFSS90] , and Hasegawa and Wadler for classes of models [Has90, Wad89] . Hasegawa [Has91] has shown that the second order minimal model-arising from the maximal consistent theory of Moggi and Statman-is parametric. By defining a formal logic, we hope to display the assumption of relational parametricity in a clear way, and to be able to obtain simple, general arguments for the results.
Our second goal is to pursue the idea of LCF. In LCF, a logic is given over a simplytyped λ-calculus with recursion and arithmetic. This λ-calculus is suitable for denotational semantics, and thus the corresponding logic acts as a rather powerful logic of programs. However, the simply-typed λ-calculus is inadequate for dealing with programming languages with abstract or polymorphic types, and an extension of the kind considered here is needed. The present work is but an intermediate step: it does not include recursion, at either the level of values or the level of types. Moreover, one may also wish to consider richer type systems (e.g., that of F ω or even Constructions), richer logics (e.g., that of Topos Theory), or more general notions of computation (e.g., as in Moggi's suggestions for the use of monads). In yet another direction, we may consider a formal theory of subtypes, based, say, on F ≤ [CG91, CG92] .
There has been some work along related lines. Abadi, Cardelli, and Curien gave a system with very elementary judgments and few relations, and with a syntax as close as possible to the basic typed λ-calculus [ACC93] . Mairson used second-order logic over the untyped λ-calculus [Mai91] . He interpreted the types of System F as relations; as it happens his interpretation of polymorphic types is not parametric, but it could easily be made so. The second-order theory of subtypes of Cardelli, Martini, Mitchell and Scedrov embodies some aspects of parametricity via an equational rule [CMMS91] .
In Section 2 of this paper we present the logic. Apart from axioms giving the equational theory of System F, the only non-logical principle is a schema for parametricity; further, only intuitionistic reasoning is employed. Other axioms may well be possible: one would expect that intuitionistic reasoning is (unsurprisingly) consistent with various choice principles. The availability of these principles would be a miniature form of Pitts' result that polymorphism can be considered as set-theoretic as long as one works constructively [Pit87] . A model can be provided as in [BFSS90] ; it remains to consider a more abstract notion and other examples. We also compare other notions of polymorphism: we present a tentative formalisation of Strachey's idea; we consider the dinatural approach of Bainbridge et al; and, finally, we make the evident generalisation of Reynold's binary relations to relations of other degrees. We conjecture that if two terms of System F are equal in all models parametric in Strachey's sense then they are also equal in all models parametric in Reynold's sense. We prove that a schema expressing dinaturality is a consequence of the schema expressing binary relational parametricity. The relationship betweeen the various notions of relational parametricity is unknown.
In Section 3 we consider a variety of constructions showing the availability of finite products and sums, second-order existential types, initial algebras and final co-algebras. The constructions are by now standard; the main point here is that we can derive their properties within our logic. We also consider the logical properties of the constructions. For example, we give a general induction principle for initial algebras and a general bisimulation (or co-induction) principle for final co-algebras [AM89, Smy91, Pit92] . For second-order existential types, parametricity becomes a "simulation principle", namely that if there is a relation between two types respected by the two corresponding "implementations" then the corresponding elements of the existential type (the abstract types) are equal. Thus we also obtain a proof rule for abstract types, along the lines envisaged by Mitchell [Mit91] . Presumably one would obtain similar principles relative to relational parametricity of other degrees, and, again, it would be interesting to know the relationships between these. In both Sections 2 and 3, we generally omit proofs.
Basic Logic
In this section we present the basic logic. The types and terms are those of System F and they are given by the grammar:
Types:
A :: 
Here R ranges over relation variables. The equality symbol is subscripted with a type, the type of the terms being equated. In System F, this type is unique, in a given environment, and so we often leave it implicit. The basic constructs are implication (⊃) and three sorts of universal quantifiers: over values; over types; and over relations between types (where R⊂A×B is read as "R is a relation between A and B"). The other constructs are useful but not altogether necessary. We make use of standard abbreviations when writing formulae, terms and types. Typing judgments are used to specify which terms have which types, and which formulae are well-formed. A second-order environment E is a finite sequence of type variables X or typings x : A in which no variable is introduced twice. The judgments E A Type and E t : A are defined in the usual way. To specify the well-formed formulae, we also need relation environments, which are finite sequences of relational typings R⊂A × B in which no variable is introduced twice. We define a judgment E G REnv to assert that G is a well-formed relation environment given E, with the obvious rule that if R⊂A × B appears in G then A and B should be well-formed types given E. We define a judgment E; G φ Prop to assert that φ is a well-formed formula given E; G. The rules for atomic formulae are:
Among the other rules we have, for example:
In order to define the consequence relation of the logic we need further logical apparatus. This concerns definable relations, their substitution for relation variables in formulae (obtaining formulae) and for type variables in types (obtaining definable relations). Substitution in formulae is needed for the rules for relational quantification; substitution in types is needed to state the parametricity schema. Definable relations are given by the grammar:
We say that such a ρ is a definable relation between A and B, writing this as ρ ⊂ A × B.
We define a judgment E; G ρ ⊂ A × B to assert that ρ is a well-formed definable relation between A and B, given E; G. There is one rule for this judgment: 
G). We sometimes treat a relation variable R ⊂ A × B as the definable relation (y : A, z : B). R(y, z).
When ρ is such a definable relation between A and B, we sometimes use the abbreviations tρu or ρ(t, u) for the corresponding φ [t, u] . A definable relation ρ can be substituted for a relation variable R in a formula ψ
[R], yielding ψ[ρ]. In particular when ψ[R] is R(t, u), the result of the substitution is ρ(t, u).
To define the substitution of definable relations for type variables in types, we need first to be able to combine relations by exponentiation and universal quantification.
is defined by:
If ρ and ρ are well-formed given E; G then so is ρ → ρ .
We can now define the substitution of definable relations for type variables in types. If
is by cases:
If each ρ i is well-formed given E; G then so is A[ ρ].
It remains to give axiom schemes and rules in order to define the consequence relation of the logic. This relation is written as Γ E;G φ, where Γ is a finite set of formulae, and all formulae involved are well-formed given E; G. The proof system has three parts:
• standard rules for the connectives and quantifiers;
• axioms and rules for the equational part of System F;
• a schema to express relational parametricity.
Natural deduction rules for the connectives and quantifiers are given as usual for intuitionistic logic. For example the rules for implication and universal quantification over types and relations are:
In the above rules the usual provisions are made that the variables being bound do not appear in assumptions.
We now give that part of the logic that deals with equality. This consists of certain axioms and axioma schemes. We adopt the convention that if an axiom φ is written, what is meant is that all sequents of the form Γ E;G φ are asserted, where φ and all formulae in Γ are well-formed for some E; G. Reflexivity is the axiom
Substitution is the axiom
We also use the congruence schemas
Lastly there are β equalities:
and η equalities:
We can now formulate the parametricity schema: 
This formula states that if one instantiates an element of a polymorphic type at two related types, then the two values obtained are themselves related; this statement expresses Reynolds' idea of binary relational parametricity.
One way to interpret this logic is to follow Bainbridge et al. [BFSS90] , taking types to be pers over the natural numbers and with universal quantification being interpreted parametrically with respect to the double-negation-closed relations. Formulae are interpreted classically, with type variables ranging over pers, ordinary variables ranging over equivalence classes relative to the appropriate per, and relation variables ranging over the double-negation closed relations. There are other evident possibilities of interpretation; for example one could interpret the logic intutionistically via a realisability interpretation. It would be good to have a general framework for interpreting the logic. Both Reynolds and Ma [MR92] and Hasegawa [Has90, Has91] have considered frameworks for parametric interpretations of System F. Pitts has shown that every hyperdoctrine model of System F fully embeds in a topos model [Pit87] . In this way the types of the model appear as "sets" in the topos. Perhaps something similar can be done here, in such a way that the relations of the model appear as relations in the topos, in the usual categorical sense. One would hope for completeness results for the present logic. In this connection one can ask too what is the most convenient language combining that of the present logic and the higherorder logic afforded by a topos; this question is apposite even without any consideration of parametricity. 
Lemma 1 (Identity Extension Lemma) For any A[ X] with free variables in X it is provable in the logic that
∀ X∀u : A, v : A. (uA[eq X ]v ≡ (u = A v)) Lemma 2 (Logical Relations Lemma) Let A 1 [ X], . . . , A m [ X],∀ X∀ Y ∀ R⊂ X × Y ∀x 1 : A 1 [ X], . . . , x m : A m [ X] ∀y 1 : A 1 [ Y ], . . . , y m : A m [ Y ]. (x 1 A 1 [ R]y 1 ∧ . . . ∧ x m A m [ R]y m ) ⊃ t[x 1 , . . . , x m ] A[ R] t[y 1 , . . . , y m ]
Categorical Matters
The types form a category, in a formal sense, within our logic. The idea is to take the type X → X as the "set" of morphisms from X to X . Composition is given by the combinator comp :
, where:
and the identity, id : ∀X. (X → X) by:
We write t; u for comp(A)(A )(A )(u)(t) (where u and t have respective types A → A and A → A , given E; G); we write id A for id(A). One can show that composition is associative, in that it is provable in the logic (without using the parametricity schema) that:
and for the identity that: 
The term is given inductively on the structure of A.
Given t, u of types B → B, C → C , we write A[ t, u] for M A A B A B t u.
One can show that this yields a functor. That is, it is provable in the logic (without using the parametricity schema) that:
and also:
One can also show that the operations of applying functors and taking graphs commute. The opposite of a relation ρ ⊂ A × B is defined by:
(y : B, x : A).xρy

Lemma 3 (Graph Lemma) Let A[ X, Y ] be a type all of whose free variables appear in the list X, Y and such that all type variables in X have only negative occurrences, and all type variables in Y have only positive occurrences. Then it can be proved in the logic that:
Here two relations are considered as equal if they coincide extensionally.
Other Notions of Parametricity
As well as Reynold's relational notion of parametricity, there are two others: an informal one due to Strachey [Str67] and a categorical one due to Bainbridge et al. [BFSS90] . Strachey's original idea was that a parametric polymorphic function behaves the same way for all types. Let us essay a formalisation of this idea. In Per models, universal types can be modelled as intersections of all their instances; so at any type a polymorphic function has the same realisor as at any other. It seems reasonable, therefore, to claim that Strachey could accept any Per model as being parametric. Now Mitchell has shown that two terms of the same type are equal in a wide class of such models iff their erasures are βη-equivalent [Mit90] . Let us (informally) define two terms of System F to be Strachey equivalent iff they are equal in all models of parametric polymorphism in Strachey's sense. Accepting Per models as parametric, we are lead to assert that Strachey equivalence implies being of the same type and having the same erasure. Conversely if two terms have the same type and erasure it seems not unreasonable that they would denote the same element of any model parametric in Strachey's sense. We therefore tentatively identify Strachey equivalence with having the same type and the same erasure (up to βη-equivalence). Along similar lines, one would informally define two terms of System F to be Reynold's equivalent iff they are equal in all models of binary relational polymorphism in Reynold's sense. Anticipating a completeness theorem for our logic relative to models of System F which are polymorphic in the binary relational sense, we can identify Reynold's equivalence with provable equality in our logic. Since there are many examples of terms provably equal in the above theory which are not Strachey equivalent, Reynolds equivalence does not imply Strachey equivalence. We conjecture the converse does hold, (A similar conjecture appears in [ACC93] 
We show now that this schema follows from that for (relational) parametricity. (This seems to answer a question raised in [BFSS90] .) First, the schema can be recast in a simpler way, as:
where (again) A[Y, X] is a type in which Y occurs only negatively and X occurs only positively and where, e.g., (·) X is λu : (∀X. A[X, X]). u(X).
For the sake of notational simplicity let us only consider the case where there are no parameters (i.e. free type variables in A other than X or Y ). So let X and Y be types and suppose that f :
. Appying the parametricity schema to f we obtain:
We may therefore apply the Logical Relations Lemma, obtaining:
and by the Identity Extension Lemma this is just:
There is an evident generalisation of relational parametricity to n-ary relational parametricity. One introduces n-ary definable relations (n ≥ 0) by:
We write ρ ⊂ (A 1 ×. . .×A n ), and say ρ is well-formed given E; G provided that φ[x 1 , . . . , x n ] is well-formed given E, x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n ; G. We also write ρ(t 1 , . . . , t n ) for φ[t 1 , . . . , t n ] . The place of the equality relation is taken by the diagonal ∆ n A where:
Exponentiation and universal quantification of n-ary relations is defined analogously to the case of binary relations, and we may substitute definable n-ary relations in types to obtain definable n-ary relations. The schema of n-ary relational parametricity is:
where A has free type variables X, Y 1 , . . . , Y n . It is unknown what the relations between these schemas are. We do not even know if the schema for binary relational parametricity implies that for unary parametricity.
Parametricity and Datatypes
We now treat datatype constructors, comprising: finite products and sums, second-order existential quantification; and initial algebras and final co-algebras. As well as categorical properties, we derive logical properties of the constructs.
Products
For the empty product, let us define:
The term = ΛXλx : X. x inhabits 1. It is provable, using dinaturality, that:
Note that we have adopted an informal style, asserting formulae. What we intend is to assert that the formulae are provable in the logic. The categorical statement ∀X∃!f : X → 1.
of terminality follows at once from the theorem.
Turning to binary products, for any types A and B, set
where Z does not appear in A or B. This yields a weak product in System F, with combi- are provable without using parametricity. Using dinaturality we obtain:
The theorem yields the usual categorical characterization of binary products, namely:
Lastly we consider the action of binary products on relations. Given ρ ⊂ A × A and
Sums
For the empty sum, define: 0 = ∀X. X Theorem 4 ∀u : 0. ⊥ It follows that 0 is initial in the categorical sense. Turning to binary sums, for types A and B we take
where and cases A,B Cf gu = uCf g
We may drop the subscripts and may also write [t, u] C for cases (t, u) . It is provable without using parametricity that
and
With dinaturality we obtain:
from which the usual categorical characterisation of binary sums follows. Next we consider the action of binary sums on relations. Given ρ ⊂ A×A and σ ⊂ B×B we take (ρ + σ)
, following the same pattern as for binary products.
Theorem 6
∀u :
By the Identity Extension Lemma, eq A + eq B and eq A+B are equivalent. With this and the above theorem we get that:
Existential Quantification
The existential quantification ∃X. A[X] is taken to abbreviate
where Y does not appear in A and is different from X.
One defines the combinator pack :
) and the combinator unpack :
and it is provable without using parametricity that 
Applying the Identity Extension Lemma, we get:
The implication from right to left can be viewed as stating that existentials are parametric (in a sense dual to that axiomatized for universals); it is a principle that enables one to show that two abstract datatypes are equal, if one can demonstrate a simulation relation between them. We view this as the proof principle requested by Mitchell in [Mit91] .
Working from left to right, one obtains:
and one can then obtain a categorical characterization of existential quantification in the form: . Then the principle of co-induction states that equality is the maximal bisimulation relation. From previous work a binary principle is expected here. There are also evident principles of other degrees. The unary principle is logically trivial. Ternary and higher degree principles seem pointless; however we do not know if they are equivalent to the usual binary one.
Initial Algebras
Final Co-algebras
